Home / Cryptography & Math / New Cryptographic Research Establishes Rigorous Security Bounds for Falcon Signature Generation Using Fixed-Point Arithmetic

New Cryptographic Research Establishes Rigorous Security Bounds for Falcon Signature Generation Using Fixed-Point Arithmetic

A new cryptographic research report authored by Vincent Hwang has established formal security bounds for the fast Fourier sampler utilized in Falcon, the lattice-based digital signature scheme selected by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for standardization as FN-DSA under the forthcoming FIPS 206 standard. The research paper, designated as Paper 2026/2902 on the Cryptology ePrint Archive, addresses a critical intersection between theoretical lattice cryptography, high-assurance formal verification, and practical fixed-point arithmetic implementation.

Falcon’s signature generation process relies heavily on its fast Fourier sampler, a complex algorithm traditionally defined over the field of complex numbers. In practical deployments, however, running complex number arithmetic efficiently and securely requires transitioning to fixed-point arithmetic. Hwang’s report explores this transition by bounding the Rényi divergence between the ideal sampler operating in real arithmetic and its concrete fixed-point implementation. This analysis is conducted specifically on the tail-cut event, a statistical condition where every generated sample remains securely within a fixed number of standard deviations of its center.

To measure security against rigorous cryptographic standards, the research evaluates the behavior of the sampler across standard parameters. For a target reference bit security level of $lambda = 128$ at dimension $n = 512$, and $lambda = 256$ at dimension $n = 1024$ over an operational lifespan of $2^64$ generated signatures, the established bounds maintain impressive security margins. Specifically, the analysis retains 126.28 and 248.78 bits of security at the plain center, and 126.70 and 253.53 bits at the fractional center, for every single key accepted by the key generation algorithm. Meanwhile, the corresponding analysis for a floating-point signer remains an open problem, having stalled due to a numerical contradiction encountered while attempting to close its underlying hypotheses.

To achieve these verified bounds, the research proposes four substantial modifications to the fixed-point implementation of the algorithm. The first modification dictates that the one-dimensional sampler, known as SamplerZ, rejects a candidate when encountering a saturated shift instead of simply saturating the shift itself. The second modification introduces three new validation checks during key generation to examine the internal tree structure: bounding the largest relative deviation of a leaf standard deviation, assessing the multiplicative perturbation of the tree map, and measuring the largest remainder on the tail-cut event.

According to the author’s proofs, these architectural changes are strictly necessary for the security guarantees to hold. Dropping the first modification would introduce an unquantified term for saturated leaves, while abandoning the second modification would completely invalidate the security level for any arbitrary number of signatures within the framework of the proof. The third and fourth modifications further streamline the mathematical architecture by computing the root node using the NTRU identity and converting a sequential inversion followed by a multiplication into a direct division operation, thereby simplifying the formal verification proofs.

A notable aspect of the research is its reliance on machine-checked proofs combined with specific code-alignment hypotheses. The kernels of the sampler and its recursive routines are formally verified using CryptoLine on aarch64 machine code objects derived from the C implementation. These objects were compiled using an optimization level of -O3 and traced under QEMU running on a Cortex-A72 processor, with the resulting components subsequently composed within the Lean theorem prover.

The broader mathematical analysis is carried out directly inside the Lean environment as far as its automated models can reach. Any individual proof lines that the automated framework cannot automatically reach are meticulously documented as such, and the overarching Lean theorems adopt the summability of their respective infinite series as a formal hypothesis. Notably, the mathematical bounds established in the report are derived analytically and do not rely on empirical sample generation.

The writing of the report itself reflects a collaborative methodology, having been produced with AI agents operating under the detailed guidance of the human author. This approach combined the formal verification of low-level machine code, the advanced Rényi divergence argument typical of modern lattice-based sampling proofs, and the engineering of specialized agent harnesses. Within this context, the tree map’s perturbation is evaluated as a multiplicative property, aligning with the principles of relative perturbation theory.

The research also addresses practical implementation hurdles regarding hardware execution and side-channel vulnerabilities. The compiled object files exhibit known timing side-channel characteristics because the compiler transformed constant-time C source code into key-dependent branching instructions when targeting the Cortex-A72 architecture. To circumvent this during verification, the arithmetic operations are instead verified using object code compiled for the Apple M1 platform, which maintains the desired execution profile. The development of a fully branchless assembly reference remains an objective for future work conducted in collaboration with automated agents.

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