Security experts have revealed that several staffers inside the White House are utilizing computers or mobile devices equipped with commercial residential proxy services, inadvertently rendering the high-level internet addresses of the Executive Office of the President available for rent to third parties across the globe.
According to findings released today by cyber intelligence firm Layer3 Intel, multiple residential proxy nodes were detected beaconing out from the dedicated internet address network reserved for the Executive Office of the President, designated as AS2650. The firm’s investigation revealed that this proxy activity was relatively persistent over a month-long window, occurring between October 5 and November 3. A comprehensive review of the active proxies associated with AS2650 showed that they successfully exited from the heavily guarded White House network 236 times during that designated timeframe.
Simultaneously, proxy tracking and security company Synthient reported via social media that the suspicious routing originating from the AS2650 network was directly tied to multiple Windows 11 installations running a service known as Infatica. Infatica is a commercial proxy program frequently bundled into seemingly benign "free" mobile applications and desktop software utilities.
Of particular concern to counterintelligence and cybersecurity analysts is the background of Infatica’s leadership. The company was founded by Vladimir Fomenko, a Russian national whose previous web hosting business, King Servers, served as the digital launchpad for cyberattacks targeting state election systems in Arizona and Illinois back in 2016. During those historic intrusions, six of the eight specific internet addresses utilized by Russian state security services to compromise sensitive voter databases were traced directly back to Fomenko’s hosting infrastructure.
The mechanics of residential proxy networks make them a pervasive threat to modern cybersecurity. While there are numerous legitimate providers in the commercial market—with varying degrees of vetting and oversight—a significant portion are operated or based out of jurisdictions like Russia and China. At their core, these services are designed to allow paying customers to rent the residential or corporate internet addresses of unsuspecting third parties. By routing their web traffic through these rented endpoints, proxy customers can effectively mask their true geographic locations and anonymize their digital footprints. From the perspective of any target website, incoming traffic appears to originate directly from the host machine’s rented IP address rather than the actual user operating behind the proxy chain.
Layer3 Intel’s telemetry indicates that the proxy exit nodes located within the White House network spanned six distinct internet addresses and were active on 26 out of 30 observed days. Interestingly, the researchers noted that the bulk of this unauthorized proxy activity tended to cluster during evening hours, typically between 5:00 p.m. and midnight, hinting at personal device usage or background application activity after standard working hours.
Perhaps most alarming to federal network defenders is that Infatica was not an isolated incident. Layer3 Intel discovered that a staggering 28 separate residential proxy services were capable of routing traffic out through the Executive Office of the President’s network infrastructure.
"This is public access," the Layer3 Intel research team wrote in an analysis published on their corporate blog. "Anybody can obtain it by signing up to a public residential proxy service, paying a few dollars and sending requests through it. We did not selectively target this network or try to make our probes exit from it. We caught this by chance, simply by requesting global rotating access through these services."
The White House did not immediately respond to requests for comment regarding the security findings.
The public exposure of high-profile government networks via residential proxies highlights a growing blind spot in institutional cybersecurity. Over the past year, security researchers have repeatedly warned that commercial residential proxy services function as a primary vector for malicious digital traffic. This ecosystem is frequently leveraged to facilitate automated account takeovers, sophisticated financial fraud, targeted cybercrime operations, and mass content scraping activities designed to fuel large-scale artificial intelligence training models.
Beyond mere traffic spoofing, these software integrations introduce profound security vulnerabilities into corporate and government environments. In late 2025, security analysts uncovered a widespread exploitation campaign where cybercriminals took advantage of inherent architectural vulnerabilities in residential proxy networks. Attackers systematically probed individual proxy endpoints to scan local internal networks for vulnerable systems, subsequently infecting them with malware. By January 2026, dozens of commercial proxy services were forced to scramble and patch their infrastructure after Ben Brundage, the founder of Synthient, publicly demonstrated how criminal elements were weaponizing these proxy connections to hijack devices residing securely behind the local firewalls of unsuspecting users.
"Some of these resellers sell bandwidth for as low as 60 cents a Gigabyte, that means for less than a dollar you can gain access into some of the most confidential and trusted networks," Brundage told KrebsOnSecurity in an interview. "The reseller ecosystem further enables this with any criminal able to buy access while skipping KYC [Know Your Customer] processes."
The root cause of this exposure typically traces back to employee behavior and device hygiene. All too frequently, residential proxy capabilities are smuggled onto corporate or government-issued hardware via consumer applications. Software developers routinely embed software development kits (SDKs) supplied by residential proxy networks into seemingly harmless desktop applications or mobile games as a monetization strategy. In exchange for integrating the SDK, the original developer receives a modest financial payout for every installation that successfully converts the user’s device into an active proxy node.
Despite the obvious national security and proprietary risks, these configurations are remarkably common across critical sectors. Data compiled during a January 2026 webinar by proxy tracking service Spur revealed that residential proxy nodes were actively detected inside nearly 300 government-owned and operated networks. Additionally, the tracking identified similar exposures across 318 utility companies, 166 healthcare organizations and hospitals, and 141 firms operating within the banking and financial sectors. Complementing these findings, enterprise security firm Infoblox published research indicating that fully 65 percent of its global customer base had corporate networks querying one or more domains associated with residential proxy infrastructure.






